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ABSTRACT. The explanations given for the Argentinean crisis are
fragmentary and center almost exclusively on the causal relationships
among economic variables. This study builds on the interpretations that
various economists have presented regarding the Argentinean crisis.
Based on identified factors, a conceptual approach is used to expose the
systemic and dynamic nature of the crisis and to permit an analysis of the
interrelationship among the economic, political and institutional factors
that triggered it.
The article contends that in addition to economic and financial fac-
tors, the Argentinean crisis was aggravated due to: (1) institutional
frailty, inadequate political management, and lack of transparency,
which led to increasing instability and uncertainty; and (2) institutional
weakness and obsolescence, which hindered reform consolidation and
juridical standards for guaranteeing property rights and adherence to
contracts. The article also maintains that the solutions to the crisis re-
quired the coordinated actions of different economic and political agents
within the framework of a new social pact.
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RESUMEN. Las explicaciones dadas sobre la crisis argentina están
fragmentadas y se centran casi que exclusivamente en la relación
fortuita de las variables económicas. Este estudio utiliza como base las
interpretaciones presentadas por diversos economistas sobre la crisis ar-
gentina. Basándose en factores identificados, utiliza un enfoque concep-
tual para exponer la naturaleza sistémica y dinámica de la crisis, y
permitir el análisis de la interrelación entre los factores económicos,
políticos e institucionales que la provocaron.
Este articulo aboga que además de los factores económicos y
financieros, la crisis argentina se agravó debido a: (1) la fragilidad
institucional, una administración política inadecuada y la falta de
transparencia, que aumentaron la inestabilidad e incertidumbre; y (2) la
debilidad institucional y el anacronismo que obstaculizan la consolidación
de la reforma y estándares jurídicos necesarios para garantizar los
derechos a la propiedad y adherencia a los contratos. El artículo también
defiende que las soluciones para la crisis exigen acciones coordinadas
entre los diferentes agentes económicos y políticos dentro del marco de
un nuevo pacto social.
RESUMO. As explicações fornecidas para a crise argentina são
fragmentadas e concentramse quase que exclusivamente nas relações
causais de variáveis econômicas. Este estudo aprofunda as interpretações
que vários economistas apresentaram a respeito da crise argentina.
Baseados em fatores identificados, é utilizada uma abordagem conceitual
para expor as naturezas sistêmica e dinâmica da crise, e para permitir a
análise do inter-relacionamento entre os fatores econômicos, políticos e
institucionais que a provocaram.
Este artigo advoga que além dos fatores econômicos e financeiros, a
crise argentina foi agravada devido a: (1) fragilidade institucional,
gestão política inadequada, e falta de transparência, a qual majorou a
instabilidade e a incerteza, e (2) debilidade institucional e anacronismo,
impedindo a consolidação da reforma e de padrões jurídicos para garantir
os direitos de propriedade e a adesão a contratos. O artigo também
sustenta que as soluções para a crise demandam ações coordenadas dos
diferentes agentes econômicos e políticos no contexto de um novo pacto
social. doi:10.1300/J140v07n01_01 [Article copies available for a fee from The
Haworth Document Delivery Service: 1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail address:
<docdelivery@haworthpress.com> Website: <http://www.HaworthPress.com> ©
2006 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.]
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I believe that the lesson we got from the Argentinean crisis is that
perhaps we had forgotten somewhat to separate the laws, norms,
rules and institutions from the control of sustainability that the
economic program required. As a result, we believe that it is ex-
tremely important to make evident the simultaneity in which peo-
ple must give respect to institutions, fulfillment of contracts,
respect for rules, respect for norms, and the quality and sus-
tainability that the economic program has already undertaken.
Speech by the Argentinean Minister of Economics,
Roberto Lavagna, 4/2003.
INTRODUCTION
Studies on the Argentinean crisis of 2001 have centered almost ex-
clusively on the interrelations among economic variables. For example,
Feldstein (2002) cites the fixed exchange rate and the elevated level of
external debt as the main factors responsible for the crisis.1 Schuler
(2002) presents evidence that dismisses the appreciation in Argentina’s
real exchange rate as the main reason. According to the author, the true
causes are found in the growth rate of the foreign public debt during the
1990s, as well as the increase in taxes implemented in 2000 by President
De la Rua. This increase contributed to decreased domestic demand and
aggravated the recession, which had started towards the end of 1999.
In the opinion of Perry and Servén (2002), deflationary adjustments
to the external shocks within a fixed exchange rate system coupled with
elevated public debt, fiscal weakness and frailty in the financial sector2
combined to bring about greater vulnerability to external shocks in Ar-
gentina. These authors maintain that the instability introduced by these
factors generated a vicious cycle characterized by overvaluation of the
peso,3 increased unemployment, reduced aggregate demand, and the
consequent economic stagnation. Specifically, they emphasize that the
political decision to fix the exchange rate to the dollar within the frame-
work of the Convertibility Plan increased the external shocks’ impact
on the overvaluation of the dollar and the devaluation of the Brazilian
real, and limited possibilities for introducing adjustments.4
Similarly, Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) assert that the rise in the
real exchange rate in Argentina not only diminished the competitive-
ness of its exports, but that it also hid fiscal and financial problems and,
as a result, postponed the adoption of corresponding measures.5 For his
part, Musa (2002) contends that the adherence to convertibility and the
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inability of Argentinean authorities to maintain a responsible fiscal pol-
icy were the principle causes of the crisis.
It is apparent that the explanations for the crisis given by economists
fundamentally center on the study of causal relationships among macro-
economic variables. These partial focuses exclude an analysis of the
role of institutional6 and political factors and do not recognize the sys-
temic nature of the crisis. As such, they lead to searches for short-term
solutions. This is particularly valid in the case of the Argentinean crisis
of 2001-2002. Although elements described by the economic models
mentioned were present,7 institutional deficiencies and poor political
management intensified the crisis and a new conceptual framework is
required to explain it. The contagion of the neighboring countries,8
whose economies are also characterized by political and institutional in-
stability, requires delving into the analysis of the Argentinean crisis in
order to extract policy lessons for the public and private sectors.
Based on contributions from the authors cited, this article develops a
conceptual systemic framework, which is valuable for studying the rela-
tionships and feedback mechanisms that are established among the de-
cisive factors behind the Argentinean crisis. With this purpose in mind,
and after a brief description of the Convertibility Plan and its macroeco-
nomic results, the third part describes the economic factors that led to
the crisis. The fourth section identifies the political and institutional fac-
tors responsible for the severity of the crisis, and the last part summa-
rizes the main political elements and formulates recommendations for
public and private sector leaders.
The methodology utilized to support the principal argument is based
on statistical techniques of multiple regressions applied to the available
data for the different institutional variables that are considered in the
study. The majority of the information comes from the results of polls
developed for the World Competitiveness Report, published by the
World Economic Forum (WEF) in 2003. However, it is necessary to
point out that only in the last few years has information on the quality of
the institutional frameworks been compiled, so it is difficult to quantify
the process and, consequently, the results must be interpreted with care.
THE CONVERTIBILITY PLAN
AND MACROECONOMIC EVOLUTION
As a result of Argentina’s weak situation due to hyperinflation in
1989, President Alfonsín resigned his position six months before the
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end of his term and was replaced by president-elect Carlos S. Menem,
who after unsuccessful attempts to apply free market ideas, named
Domingo Cavallo as Minister of Economics.9 The new minister took a
series of measures at the start of 1991 that constituted the basis for the
Convertibility Plan,10 launched on April 1 of the same year.11
The plan was successful, though not all the reforms that had been
announced were implemented.12 Argentina soon achieved significant
monetary and fiscal results, along with real growth in its GDP. First, a
large reduction in inflation was achieved, falling to levels similar to that
of developed countries. The fiscal deficit was kept at minimal levels,
not only due to the extraordinary influx of revenues for privatization,13
but also due to the elimination of some of the roots of corruption and
causes of the deficit. As a result of these reforms, between 1991 and
1998 the Argentinean economy registered elevated growth rates in real
gross domestic product, reaching an accumulated increase of 42% dur-
ing that period.
The implementation of the Plan resulted in greater economic stabil-
ity, which reduced uncertainty among local economic agents, curbed
the flight of capital, and attracted new foreign investors. Consequently,
domestic credit increased, which, combined with the elimination of in-
flation and the reduction of country risk, produced lower interest rates
and higher investment and consumption growth rates. As will be seen in
section 3.3, an inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) further contrib-
uted to strengthening the productive investment process.14
THE ARGENTINEAN CRISIS:
A SYSTEMIC APPROACH
As the introduction indicates, the studies that describe the crisis in
Argentina have principally centered on an analysis of economic factors.
We also saw in the previous section that although the Convertibility
Plan was initially successful, its results were short-lived and could not
guarantee the sustainability of the economic model.
Public Deficit, Foreign Debt and Falling Investment:
Causes of Stagnation
In 1995 the process of selling public companies was completed at
the same time that a strong drop in tax collection occurred due to a re-
cession caused by the “tequila” effect.15 The fiscal situation continued
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to worsen due to two additional factors. The first was related to public
pension system reform in 1994, which introduced various new elements
into the design of the Social Security System. In effect, taxes collected
by the federal government were reduced, because worker contributions
began to be administered by private entities. The social security contri-
butions that employers made were gradually reduced from 33% of the
nominal salary in January 1993 to 16.5% in March 1995. The reduction
in total social security contributions between 1995 and 2000 totaled
10 billion dollars (Roca, 2001).16
The second factor that aggravated the fiscal problem was the massive
transfer of revenues from the central government to the provinces. From
the start, the decentralization model did not work, as the provincial gov-
ernments knew that the resources to cover their expenses would be pro-
vided by the central government as a last resort. Therefore, they lacked
the incentive to maintain an adequate level of fiscal discipline and collec-
tion. As Saieght and Tomassi (1999) explain, such an effect is exacer-
bated when the macroeconomic forecast looks favorable, since provincial
governments tend to increase public spending in anticipation of an in-
crease in funds from the national government.
Table 1 shows the evolution of the fiscal deficit for the federal gov-
ernment at a consolidated level (provinces included). The provinces’
deficit increased over the period, arriving at 2.5% of the GDP in 2001. It
can also be observed that during this period Argentina had to resort to
public debt in order to cover the growing fiscal deficit.
As Diagram 1 suggests, the combination of these factors led the Ar-
gentinean economy into a vicious cycle that brought about a deep reces-
sion.17 The recurring and growing fiscal deficit forced the government
to increase its debt positions in domestic and foreign capital markets. In
turn, the rise in debt increased amortization and interest payments (debt
services), which reduced the governments’ (both federal and provin-
cial) ability to invest in the infrastructure necessary to develop private
activity. Table 2 shows the evolution of these variables.
Additionally, and as is also indicated in Diagram 1, the demand for
funds in the domestic capital market on the part of the government re-
duced the credit supply for the private sector.18 Domestic interest rates
were raised, forcing private companies to resort to borrowing from
abroad.
The consequences of this vicious cycle are obvious. The fall in in-
vestment generated a reduction in aggregated demand, and thus in
profit. Additionally, the employment level dropped, thereby reducing
income, which was accompanied by a drop in both consumption and
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savings (see Table 1). Furthermore, the economic deceleration meant
reduced tax collection, which added to fiscal evasion, further increasing
the deficit and public sector’s financial requirements. This point, as sug-
gested in Diagram 1, reinforced the dynamics of the vicious cycle,
leading to a larger drop in productive investment.
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TABLE 1. Fiscal Deficit, Public Debt, Growth, and Unemployment
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
GDP (1) 5.7 5.8 –2.8 5.5 8.1 3.9 –3.4 –0.5 –4.5
Federal Deficit (2) 0.4 –0.9 –1.9 –2.8 –1.4 –1.8 –3.0 –2.2 –3.9
Consolidated Deficit (2) –0.3 –1.9 –3.1 –3.6 –2.4 –2.5 –4.7 –3.6 –6.4
Consolidated Public Debt (2) 32.8 35.1 39.2 39.8 38.1 41.3 47.4 50.8 64.1
Gross Domestic Investment (2) 18.6 20.0 17.9 18.5 20.1 20.7 18.7 17.2 15.5
Domestic Savings (2) 14.6 15.1 15.7 15.7 15.3 15.0 13.7 14.0 13.6
Total Consumption (2) 5.3 5.0 –3.6 5.9 7.9 2.1 –2.1 –0.1 –5.1
Unemployment (2) 9.6 11.5 17.5 17.2 14.9 12.9 14.3 15.1 16.4
(1) Percentage change with respect to the previous year.
(2) Percentage of GDP.
Source: CEPAL(2002)(www.eclac.cl/estadisticas), and Krueger (2002) (www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/071702.htm)
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DIAGRAM 1. Economic Factors in the Argentinean Crisis: A Systematic Focus
External Shocks, Overseas Financing and Unemployment
During the 1990s, there was a high availability of funds in the inter-
national capital market. This gave Latin American countries, whose do-
mestic savings rates were low, a source for both public and private
financing. However, access to this financing diminished due to several
external shocks. The first was the Asian crisis of 1997. One year later
the Russian crisis unfolded when the government of that country de-
faulted on part of its short-term internal debt. Lastly, in January 1999,
Brazil devalued its currency in light of its inability to continue support-
ing its fixed value in relation to the dollar.
As Diagram 1 suggests, the worldwide macroeconomic instability
significantly reduced the funds available to emerging countries, and as a
result, interest rates increased. In Argentina’s case, the reduction of for-
eign funds combined with a deteriorating fiscal situation–among other
factors19–led to an increase in country risk, also due to the contagion ef-
fect. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the country risk20 of the bonds
issued by the government of Argentina.
As Figure 1 shows, from 1998 on, the spread ascends rapidly, arriv-
ing at values of more than 7,000 basis points at the end of 2002. This in-
crease meant greater debt services (see Table 2),21 which also in turn
represented a greater financial burden for the public and private sectors.
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TABLE 2. Primary Non-Financial Variable in the National Public Sector
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total Public
Expenditures (1)
25.6 25.4 25.2 25.8 28.5 28.2 29.8 26.63
Loans from Local
Financial Sector to
Public Sector (2)
10.72 11.00 10.47 13.88 18.38 24.53 43.54 81.25
Public Services Debt (3) 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.6 3.4 4.0 4.8 2.63
Public Investment (4) 6.22 – 6.35 6.19 5.01 4.58 4.40 3.61
Active Interest Rates (5) – 10.48 12.64 110.82 13.45 16.86 49.96 78.83
(1) Percentage of GDP. Includes financial operations.
(2) Percentage of the total borrowed from the financial sector measured in December of each year.
(3) Internal and external debt service as a percentage of GDP.
(4) Percentage of primary public expenditures.
(5) Measured each year through December with the exception of 2002 whose value corresponds to the month of August.
Source: Ministry of Economy of Argentina Republic, Statistics Report (www.mecon.gov.ar).
This brought about an increase in interest rates, and created an addi-
tional reduction in productive investment, which then led to a drop in
employment. In effect, as Table 1 indicates, near the end of the last de-
cade, unemployment was above 14% of the active economic popula-
tion, and then reached 16.4% near the end of 2001.
Macroeconomic Instability, FDI and the Flight of Capital
Argentina was one of the main recipients of FDI flows into Latin
America during the 1990s. During the 1990-1994 period, it received an
annual average of US$2.99 billion, which increased between 1995 and
1998 to US$6.78 billion. The largest flow was reached in 1999, when
foreign investment hit a value of US$23.15 billion.22 Spain stood out
among the countries that exported capital, with investments during the
period of 1992-2001 reaching $26.3 billion (Chislett, 2003). However,
this flow began to diminish due to the perception of risk that foreign in-
vestors had because of greater economic instability, the continued dete-
rioration of the fiscal situation, and the start of the recession in 2000 (see
Table 1). FDI flows fell to US$5 billion in 2001, representing barely
6.5% of the FDI received by Latin America that year (J.P. Morgan,
2003).
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FIGURE 1. Sovereign Country Risk of Argentinean Sovereign Bonds
Source: Adapted from J.P. Morgan, Emerging Countries Indicators (2003).
Additionally, as Diagram 1 suggests, Argentina saw itself affected by
a strong reduction in the supply of private credit, principally caused by a
very sizeable flight of capital.23 This massive exit of funds also contrib-
uted to an increase in domestic interest rates and, consequently, the
level of productive investment was reduced.
This situation was aggravated towards the end of 2001.24 A drop in
deposits led to lower liquidity in the banking system, an increase in ac-
tive interest rates and, consequently, lower availability of credit for the
private sector. Afterwards, declarations of default were made and the
end of convertibility was announced. On December 20, 2001, President
de la Rúa resigned. During the next two weeks, various governments
followed and the game rules for national and foreign investment were
changed, a fact which increased uncertainty for economic agents.25
As Diagram 1 indicates, the retreat of foreign capital, together with
the acceleration in the flight of domestic capital, diminished the amount
of productive investment, which reduced the aggregated employment
demand and income, intensifying the recession in the Argentinean
economy.26
The combined effect of these factors was reflected in an increase in
poverty,27 underemployment and unemployment, and emphasized the
trend of increased inequality that had escalated without interruption
since 1993 (Perry and Servén, 2002). Diagram 1 offers us a global view
of the crisis from the economic standpoint, showing the interrelation-
ship established between the diverse factors present. Nevertheless, the
explanation of the crisis is still incomplete, in as much as the influence
of political and institutional factors have not yet been taken into ac-
count. The next section tackles the analysis of these elements.
POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS IN THE CRISIS
In the previous sections, the effects of the Convertibility Plan were
described and the relationships established among the economic fac-
tors–which partly explain its failure towards the end of the 1990s–were
defined. As the systemic analysis illustrated, aside from the external
shocks and withdrawal of capital flows, the remaining factors of the Ar-
gentinean crisis were domestic. In this section, it is argued that the crisis
escalated due to different political and institutional factors, whose ori-
gins can be traced to the contemporary history of the country.
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The Institutional Framework: Populism, Clientelismo
and Public Spending
Since the beginning of Juan Domingo Perón’s first term in 1946, Ar-
gentina has been led by governments that to a greater or lesser extent
have received their principal electoral support from nationalist popu-
list policies.28 As Diagram 2 shows, this phenomenon, also present in
other Latin American countries, was supported in, public expendi-
tures, clientelismo29 and favor-seeking behavior, among others. As
such, the populist regime tried to legitimize itself through: (1) high pub-
lic spending policies; (2) the granting of public positions in exchange
for votes and support, and (3) the granting of generous contracts, perks
and subsidies to different societal sectors close to the regime.
Clientelismo took on immense importance in Argentina with the re-
turn to democracy in 1983. In effect, during the 1983-1999 period, the
number of political party members grew 270% (United Nations, 2002).
One of the consequences of the hyperactivity in the political market was
a substantial rise in the number of political positions. According to
Krueger (2002), in 1999, 12% of the labor force in all of Argentina
worked in the public sector, while in other countries, like Mexico and
Brazil, the levels maintained were lower–4.5, and 7.3%, respectively.
Additionally, clientelismo practices had a negative impact on public
administration efficiency, given the low levels of training and the
non-existence of productivity incentives. As Figure 2 illustrates, com-
petency among public employees was clearly lower than what was ob-
served among private sector workers–much lower than in countries like
Spain and France.30
Argentinean governments have frequently been accused of favoring
corporations or individuals linked to the party in power. As Figure 3
shows, in the opinion of businessmen, favor-seeking on the part of cer-
tain sectors of the Argentinean society is a habitual practice in the coun-
try. In particular, Argentina’s poor performance is noted in comparison
to countries like the U.S. and Japan.
It is important to note that public expenditures in Argentina have
grown over the last 40 years. While in 1960 consolidated public spend-
ing, as a percentage of GDP, was 18%, its value rose to 25% around
1980 and to over 30% at the end of 1999 (Bulacio, 2000). The rapid
growth in public spending–primarily during the 1990s–has been closely
related to the increase in spending on public sector wages, which has al-
ready been indicated as a very common practice in populist regimes.31
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Thus, a relationship is observed between the institutional and economic
factors within a country.
Populism, Judicial Dependence and Corruption
In order to protect the interests of political organizations, trade unions
and corporate management close to its populist regimes, an institutional
framework was adopted in Argentina that looked to maintain the status
quo.
A clear example of this was the lack of independence of the judicial
power in Argentina. In Figure 4, we can observe that in comparative in-
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FIGURE 3. Rent Seeking Practices (2002)
Source: Own elaboration based on World Economic Forum (2003).
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FIGURE 2. Competency Among Public Employees (2002)
Source: Own elaboration based on World Economic Forum (2003).
ternational terms, Argentina is among the judicial systems most de-
pendent on political power (WEF, 2003). Evidence of this is the fact that
the populist rule, in both the central government and the provinces, has
proceeded to remove and to choose judges based on their ideological af-
finity and on their disposition to defend the interests in the game.32
Another result of the interdependence between politics and judicial
power is the limited transparency in government decision-making. Ar-
gentina placed poorly in the surveys done by the World Economic Forum
on governmental transparency (WEF, 2003). As Figure 5 illustrates, Ar-
gentina was last among the 80 countries in the study.
As Diagram 2 suggests, judicial power dependence, coupled with the
weakness of the judicial framework and the lack of transparency and ac-
countability, created a climate ripe for impunity and corruption33 in
both the public and private sectors.34
To summarize, as Diagram 2 indicates, the weakness in the institu-
tional framework has generated a growing perception of uncertainty
and distrust with both domestic and foreign economic players, not only
around the government and political parties, but also toward other in-
stitutions such as the courts, banks and private companies.35 Another
result of this dynamic, shown in Diagram 2, has been the loss of legiti-
macy for political organizations in Argentina.
Institutional Framework and Macroeconomic Evolution
The institutional framework described in the previous sections was
kept invariable during the 1990s, the period of enforcement of the Con-
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FIGURE 4. Independence of the Judicial Power with Respect to the Govern-
ment (2002)
Source: Own elaboration based on World Economic Forum (2003).
vertibility Plan. The lack of fit between the existing framework and the
objectives pursued by the plan, on one hand, and the resistance to adopt-
ing a new institutional framework, on the other, created significant bar-
riers for the economic and political reforms. As Diagram 2 suggests, the
institutional and political factors indicated also shaped the evolution of
the Argentinean economy during the 1990s, and were decisive in the
unfolding of the crisis. As will be analyzed in the next sections, the pop-
ulist practices based on clientelismo, the weakness of the judicial
system and corruption were also responsible for:
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DIAGRAM 2. Institutional Dynamics and the Crisis in Argentina
1. introducing inflexibility into the labor market,
2. contributing to worsening the deficit through increases in public
spending, and
3. resulting in declines in both the domestic and foreign productive in-
vestment flows required to maintain economic growth.
Populism, Labor Market Rigidities and Employment
With respect to the labor structure, the overall strategy of the populist
governments and the labor unions under their influence consisted in unions
being granted the power to negotiate sector agreements in matters such
as employment conditions and wages. As Figure 6 shows, in the mid-
1990s, over 72% of employed Argentineans were protected by collec-
tive bargaining agreements–a much higher percentage than in other
countries. In addition, the populist governments offered improvements
to workers through the promulgation of employment protection laws,
which, together with the centralized negotiation of labor agreements,
introduced major rigidities into the labor market.
These labor market rigidities impeded:
a. short-term wage rate adjustments, when confronted with fluctua-
tions in labor supply and demand,
b. maintenance of an employment growth rate in the long-term,
since the high costs of firing discouraged firms from creating em-
ployment (OECD 2000), and
c. resistance to the negative effects that domestic and external shocks
had on the employment level (Phelps and Zoega, 2001).
Judicial Dependence, Corruption, Instability and Uncertainty:
Their Impact on FDI and the Domestic Credit Supply
As Diagram 3 indicates, the combined effect of limited property
rights protection, corruption,36 instability and uncertainty led to loss of
confidence among the economic players in the judicial-legal frame-
work, and, consequently, the flight of capital and a drop in both direct
and indirect foreign investment. Additionally, the government’s non-
fulfillment of contractual obligations, identified as “obsolescing bar-
gaining” by Vernon (1971), affected foreign economic agents’ deci-
sions on investing in Argentina.37
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Figure 7 shows the relationship between FDI and property rights pro-
tection. As can be observed, the relationship is positive, with a partial
correlation of 0.25.
In addition, Diagram 3 shows how the supply of domestic credit,38
directly influenced by the institutional variables indicated, also affected
productive investment levels. The analysis of the domestic capital stock
development shows that between 1990 and 2000 Argentina experienced
a massive flight of capital.
In other words, when faced with general distrust and lack of guaran-
tees for recouping credit, economic agents prefer to abstain from invest-
ing, and as the case of Argentina demonstrates, they choose to withdraw
their capital. This leads to a reduction in credit supply and a drop in the
productive investments that the economy requires to generate employ-
ment and maintain the growth rate of its product.
In fact, Figure 8 illustrates how a lack of confidence in the political
leadership also contributed to reducing domestic credit supply in the
country (positive correlation of 0.553).39
With the intention of investigating the relationship between quality
in the judicial environment and the reduction in domestic credit supply
that Argentina experienced, an analysis was also done between domes-
tic credit and two variables: (a) level of property rights protection, and
(b) degree of judicial independence. Figures 9 and 10 show that a posi-
tive relationship was found (0.692 and 0.614, respectively), which veri-
fies that the deterioration in property rights protection and the weakness
of the judicial framework also explain, at least partially, the reduction in
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Source: Own preparation based on World Economic Forum (2003).
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Source: Own preparation based on data from WEF (2003).
the domestic credit supply that the country experienced during the last
years of the 1990s.
It is clear that the lack of judicial independence and the inability to en-
force adherence to contracts and norms that govern financial transactions
explain the massive withdrawal of bank deposits and the consequent rup-
ture in the payment chain–essential elements in the functioning of any
modern economy.
To summarize, Figure 11 allows us to take into account the relation-
ship that exists between the lack of confidence in the economic situa-
tion, the reduction in direct and indirect foreign investment, and the
flight of domestic credit.40 This figure shows that confidence and FDI
are variables that tend to move in tandem. It is clear that at the end of the
1990s, an inverse relationship existed between confidence and the flight
of capital.41
As is suggested on the left of Diagram 3, instability and inadequate
political management led to corruption and uncertainty, accelerated the
flight of capital and discouraged foreign investment. The combination
of these factors resulted in a reduction in the resources available for pro-
ductive investment, an increase in the cost of capital and with it a fall in
product growth rate, intensifying the recession.
FDI and Credit Supply:
Their Impact on the Economic Growth Rate
Diagram 3 shows that the dynamics that were established between
the institutional, economic, and political factors drove the Argentinean
economy into a vicious cycle of low investment, low employment gen-
eration, low income levels, and as a result, falling levels of domestic
consumption and savings–key factors for economic growth. In other
words, the systemic analysis allows verification of the fact that the insti-
tutional problems were also present in the Argentinean economic crisis,
since they conditioned the behavior of economic agents.
In order to reinforce our argument, various multiple regressions
were done between the average GDP growth rate during the period of
1997-2001 and a series of institutional variables. The results are noted
in Annex 1. With the exception of the government acts transparency
variable, all the other institutional variables appear to influence growth
significantly. Furthermore, the positive sign of the institutional vari-
ables reinforces the argument supported in this work: the greater the in-
stitutional quality, the greater the economic growth.42 This coincides
with the evidence contributed by previous works.43
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In the second part of this work we have held that the formal and infor-
mal institutions inherited by the populist regimes:
1. conditioned the rhythm and the results of free market reforms in
Argentina;
2. generated great uncertainty towards and distrust of the economic
players;
3. contributed to intensifying the Argentinean crisis and made it
harder to resolve.
The deterioration and frailty of the political-institutional framework
played a key role in the evolution of the crisis, and it is therefore neces-
sary to take into account these factors in making a better diagnostic and
designing sustainable solutions.
In a manner of concluding, Figure 12 shows that a clear relationship
exists between the degree of institutional development44 and gross do-
mestic product per capita for the collection of selected countries (posi-
tive correlation of 0.818).
In the next section, some lessons are extracted from the Argentinean
crisis for the parties responsible so that they may design, execute and
evaluate development policies, as well as for the domestic and foreign
companies that operate in emerging economies that are characterized by
instability and uncertainty.
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CONCLUSIONS
In addition to the domestic and foreign factors indicated in the litera-
ture, towards the end of 2001 the Argentinean crisis was aggravated by
weaknesses in the institutional structure and political instability. As was
described in the preceding section of this work, institutional frailty and
poor political management increased instability and uncertainty, and
impeded development of a timely and adequate response during the
different stages of the crisis.
Likewise, the obsolescence of the institutions in power conditioned the
rhythm and the results of free market reforms in Argentina. Furthermore,
the weakness of the judicial framework added to the lack of transparency
and accountability, creating an environment conducive to corruption.
This, in turn, impeded the securing of property rights and adherence to
contracts.
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The data and calculations have shown a high correlation between in-
stitutional frailty, credit supply, and economic growth. The increase in
uncertainty and the loss of confidence deters FDI, and leads to a mas-
sive outflow of capital, along with a drop in domestic credit supply, and,
consequently, a reduction in resources available for productive invest-
ment. These factors plunged Argentina into a vicious cycle of distrust,
political instability, unemployment and economic recession.
Argentina’s case also illustrates another interesting problem that will
require greater investigation in the future. The transition to the new po-
litical and economic model has been made difficult by a lack of adjust-
ment between the formal institutions and the informal institutional
frameworks that govern the economic and social relationships. While
the creation of these formal institutions has implicated, in principal,
changes in labor, finance, education, and trade legislation, the informal
institutions (traditions, practices, etc.) have required more time to ad-
just. This imbalance has created a paradoxical situation: the institu-
tional platform has been prepared–at least formally–but individuals
and groups have continued operating using informal institutions ac-
quired during previous regimes.
In summary, the dynamics described indicate that the crisis in Argen-
tina is of a systemic and multidimensional nature and establishes the
need to tackle the analysis from an integrated perspective that allows
better understanding of the interrelationship between the economic, po-
litical and institutional factors that unfolded. Only under circumstances
of understanding the multiple relationships established between the fac-
tors/key variables and the role that the different economic and political
agents play will a better diagnostic be developed, along with a political
framework that allows the designing of viable and sustainable solutions
to the crisis.
NOTES
1. Feldstein (2002) indicates that the low domestic savings rate and elevated pub-
lic spending were the direct causes of Argentina’s indebtedness.
2. One of the greatest weaknesses of the Argentinean financial system is related to
elevated credit granted to the public sector, which constitutes 26.4% of banks’ debt
portfolio.
3. De la Torre et al. (2002) have estimated that around 2000, the real exchange rate
in Argentina was overvalued by 50%.
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4. According to Perry and Servén (2002) and De la Torre et al. (2002), from the be-
ginning, President de la Rúa’s government fell into the trap of low growth, high debt,
overvalued currency, and a fixed exchange rate.
5. Among the problems mentioned by Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) are: the
dollarization of corporate and government liabilities, which made the country more
vulnerable to depreciation in the exchange rate and the low proportion of goods traded
abroad as a percentage of GDP.
6. Institutions are created to: (1) structure and coordinate political, economic, and
social relationships among the members of a certain society and which are therefore es-
sential for economic development (Williamson, 1985; North, 1991), and (2) reduce the
uncertainty in exchanges derived from imperfect information that economic players
possess (North, 1993, 1995). Market efficiency depends on their quality and function-
ing.
7. Argentina exhibited an elevated fiscal deficit and had a fixed exchanged rate,
and, additionally, investors’ expectations for the floating of the exchange rate and the
devaluation that followed produced a massive outflow of capital, reduced the interna-
tional reserves and pressured interest rates.
8. Between July and August of 2002, Uruguay suffered the “contagion effect” of
the Argentinean crisis with a restriction on the withdrawal of bank capital and uncer-
tainty around the viability of certain financial institutions.
9. The previous Economic Minister, Herman González, had to resign after another
hyperinflation event occurred in January 1991.
10. The Currency Board, the monetary component of the Plan, was based on
one-to-one parity between the peso and the U.S. dollar, entrusting to the Central Bank
the responsibility of guaranteeing this conversion with reserves denominated in for-
eign currencies in an amount equal to 100% of the monetary base. This restriction on
the reserve composition could be relaxed in certain circumstances, permitting that 80%
of the monetary base was backed with dollars, while the remaining 20% was composed
of national government debt titles.
11. Among the measures promised by the Menem administration were: privatiza-
tion of state companies, government reform, opening of the economy to the foreign
flow of goods and services, fiscal discipline, labor reform, and economic deregulation.
12. Beyond privatization, the national government structures as well as those of the
provincial states–principally the latter–were not greatly modified. In addition, labor re-
form only introduced minor modifications, without offering solutions to the inflexibili-
ties of the labor market. For a description of the labor market in Argentina and other
Latin American countries, see Márquez and Pages (1998).
13. The government sold more than 250 companies, mainly in the sectors of telecom,
gas, oil, rail, air, and electricity, receiving more than US$30 billion (Espert, 1996). Ac-
cording to Krueger (2002), during the 1992-1994 period, the average consolidated
public deficit was situated at around 0.9% of the value of the GDP.
14. In addition, FDI not only generated tax revenue, but also created direct and indi-
rect jobs. For example, the FDI stock from Spanish business alone generated 11% of
the total tax revenue in Argentina around the year 2001, and in turn gave direct employ-
ment to 70,000 workers (FUCAES, 2002).
15. Tax collection during 1995 was 5.2% lower than what was registered in 1994
(Ministry of Economy of Argentina Republic, Economic Report, 1996).
16. Roca (2001) also estimates that this amount represents approximately 25% of
the public debt generated during the same period.
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17. As a consequence of the recession that began in 2000, the total tax collected
dropped by almost 11% between the years 1998 and 2001 (Krueger, 2002).
18. Between 1993 and 1998, both domestic credit to the public sector and to the pri-
vate sector increased to 68% and 72%, respectively. However, for the period between
1998 and 2001, while internal credit to the public sector was reduced by 5%, credit to
the private sector was reduced by 35% (Ministry of Economy of Argentina Republic).
19. The drop in the international price of Argentinean product exports, along with
the rigidity of the exchange system tied to the dollar, are the factors commonly cited in
the literature. For a more extensive explanation, see Fanelli (2002).
20. The literature addressing “country risk” recognizes the effect of the fiscal situa-
tion on the level of country-risk. See Eaton and Stiglitz (1986) for a comprehensive re-
view of the literature.
21. In mid- 2001, 32% of the public debt was composed of debt with floating inter-
est rates (Pontoni, 2002).
22. These values represented 16.7%, 12.25%, and 25.58%, respectively, of the FDI
received by Latin America (Paiva Abreu, 2002).
23. The process of the flight of capital reached its highest point in 2002, when $13.5
billion left the country, which represented 16% of the GDP (Blázquez and Sebastián,
2004).
24. First, as noted by Perry and Servén (2002), the Minister created an import tax
and subsidized exports. This decision increased doubts about the support for converti-
bility, since it had broken the basic contract of one to one peso-dollar parity for trade
transactions, and it raised the prospect that it could also be broken for financial transac-
tions. Second, on November 30, 2001, Cavallo imposed a withdrawal restriction on
savings account holders’ deposits, a measure known as the corralito.
25. In effect, among other measures, the peso was devalued, an asymmetrical
pesificación was declared, taxes for oil exports were fixed and charges for public ser-
vices were frozen. The tax on profits was increased as well as the tax on assets (Schuler,
2002).
26. The default of the Argentinean government affected not only foreign holders of
public debt, but also domestic holders–mainly banks and the Pension Fund Adminis-
tration. In June of 2001, domestic public debt represented approximately 40% of the to-
tal public debt (Pontoni, 2002). This fact brought about additional reductions in
income, investment, savings and consumption.
27. According to the National Institute of Statistics and Census of Argentina
(INDEC, 2002), 35.9% of the population in May 2001 was found living below the pov-
erty line. In October of the same year, the level rose to 38.3%.
28. For a description of this populist phenomenon in Argentina, see also Auyero
(2000).
29. Clientelismo is an old political practice in Argentina that looks for electoral sup-
port through the granting of public administration positions. It is based on the contract-
ing of an agent (puntero, according to Argentinean political terminology), charged
with hiring and mobilizing members in parties’ internal elections. Thus, the politician
with the greatest backing of votes within the party is chosen to represent the party in the
general elections, obliging him or her to repay the support received through positions in
public offices or within the party itself.
30. As an example, note that the opening of a new company in Argentina required
60 more days of bureaucratic procedure, in comparison to the number of days required
in Canada (Djankov et al., 2002).
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31. Krueger (2002) indicates that public spending in wages increased from 7.63%
of GDP in 1991 to 9.87% in 2001.
32. Since the presidency of Perón, five of the seventeen presidents (in a period of 50
years) during their term have appointed all the members of the Supreme Court of Jus-
tice. The average duration of justices’ positions in Argentina is 3.7 years, compared to
12.5 years in the U.S.A. or 9.6 years in Australia (Spiller and Tommasi, 2000).
33. According to studies on the perception of corruption done annually by Trans-
parency International, with the exception of the periods 1988-1992 and 1980-1985,
when it obtained averages of 5.91 and 4.94, respectively, Argentina has had marks of
four points or less (0 = total corruption, 10 = without corruption).
34. In addition to judicial dependence, and perhaps as a consequence of it, a clear ju-
dicial ineffectiveness is observed related to restricting and adhering to property rights
in Argentina. Economic agents, according to the WEF survey, share this opinion. The
managers polled placed Argentina last in this variable.
35. Towards the end of 2001, the distrust of Argentinean society towards its institu-
tions was above the Latin American average. In response to the question “Would you
say that you have much, some, little or no confidence in . . .?” the total of the “little” and
“none” responses was above or equal to 90% for political parties, the government,
banks, national congress, and judicial power, and about or equal to 80% in relation to
municipal administrators and private companies. In 1996, 34% of those surveyed ex-
pressed satisfaction with the democracy; around 2002, the percentage had fallen to 8%
(Latinobarómetro, 2002).
36. For an extensive study on the impact of corruption on the rate of growth, see
Murphy, Séller and Vishny (1993) and Mauro (1995).
37. According to evaluations by Cornelius et al. (2002), insecurity and instability,
among other factors, impeded the arrival in Argentina of at least US$14.15 billion be-
tween the years 1990 and 1999. In addition, a poll taken on Spanish business leadership
indicated that corruption, judicial insecurity, bureaucracy and political instability are
likewise among the major obstacles to investment in Latin America (BID, 2004).
38. It is necessary to clarify that the domestic credit supply consists not only of the
domestic capital that forms part of the local financial system, but also of the foreign
capital invested in fixed and variable financial instruments (investment portfolios).
39. Brunetty, Kismko, and Weder (1998) also found a direct and positive impact be-
tween the credibility of public organizations and private productive investment.
40. Confidence in the future evolution of the economy is an index set by
Latinobarómetro. Foreign direct investment and flights of capital are expressed in
flows, and are taken from De Soto (2001). All measurements have been standardized in
line with 1996 for the purpose of facilitating interpretation.
41. The high value of FDI registered in 1999 is due to the sale of Argentine state pe-
troleum YPF to the Spanish oil company Repsol.
42. And vice versa as well: the greater the economic growth, the greater the institu-
tional development. This relationship is not the focus of this article’s study, but can be
found in Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens (1993).
43. See, for example, Barro (1991) and Sachs and Warner (1997). For his part, Le-
vine (1999) holds that a higher quality in institutions leads to greater financial develop-
ment, and hence, greater economic growth.
44. The index of institutional development proposed by the World Economic Fo-
rum (2003) is a combination of different institutional indicators.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix, the different cross regressions presented in this paper are
explained. Each one of them has as its dependent variable the average GDP
growth rate during the period of 1997-2001. The independent variables are
classified into two groups: on one side, economic variables; on the other, insti-
tutional variables.
Within these economic variables we include the investment rate as a per-
centage of GDP, and human capital is measured as the average number of
years of schooling for the economically active population. The first variable
controls the convergence effect that predicts the neoclassical model: the
greater the level of investment as a percentage of GDP, ceteris paribus, the
lower the growth rate of the product. The problem with this approach is that
such a relationship does not apply to samples containing both developed and
developing countries. In another words, and following Mankiw, Romer and
Weil (1992), the neoclassical model predicts conditional convergence: each
country converges to its own stationary state, which primarily depends on its
level of human capital. As a consequence, the cross regressions include the
measurement of human capital as a basic specification.
TABLE A1. Regression on the Average GDP Growth Rate (1997-2001)*
1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant 3.045
(19.106)
3.276
(23.428)
3.109
(20.290)
3.286
(19.343)
3.211
(21.388)
3.319
(22.952)
Investment
(% of GDP)
–0.012
(–2.241)
–0.013
(–2.441)
–0.012
(–2.302)
–0.013
(–2.220)
–0.013
(–2.283)
–0.017
(–2.807)
Human
Capital
0.843
(5.523)
1.017
(7.641)
0.949
(7.025)
1.173
(8.273)
1.015
(7.326)
1.136
(9.107)
Index
Institutional
0.128
(3.506)
Judicial
Independence
0.065
(2.758)
Property
Rights
0.098
(3.301)
Gov’t
Transparency
0.040
(0.997)
Absence of
Rent Seeking
0.097
(2.588)
Competency of
Pub. Empl.
0.088
(1.832)
R square
(adjusted) 0.827 0.810 0.822 0.780 0.806 0.792
*Between parentheses the value of statistic t is included.
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APPENDIX (continued)
With respect to the institutional variables, the World Economic Forum de-
fines these in the following manner:
• Institutional Index: an index composed of 37 different sub indexes,
grouped into two large categories. The first is related to corruption,
while the second is concerned with laws and contracts.
• Judicial Independence: measures the degree of independence of the
judicial power with respect to the government.
• Property Rights: measures the degree of protection offered by the ju-
dicial system to financial assets and to the wealth of economic agents.
• Government Transparency: measures the quantity and quality of
government information related to (1) its public policy decisions; (2)
the changes that can take place as a result of these policies.
• Absence of Favor Seeking: measures the extent to which govern-
ment decisions involving policies and contracts are independent of
the individual and companies that are affected by the results of such
policies.
• Competency of public employees: measures the efficiency level of
public employees in comparison with what is observed in private sec-
tor employees. We assume that it is a proxy of clientelismo.
The sample that we have utilized in this work was obtained from the data
contributed by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in its 2003 survey, consist-
ing of 80 countries ranked according to the classifications reached in three dif-
ferent areas: Economic, Technical, and Institutional. Due to the inexistence of
certain dates for some countries, we ended up utilizing a smaller sample con-
sisting of 45 countries.
The software used for both the graphical analysis as well as the statistics
was the program SPSS version 12.0
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